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I. INTRODUCTION
Developing countries have entered into a large number of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), free trade agreements (FTAs), and regional
trade agreements (RTAs) that, among other matters, include provisions
for the protection of foreign investors' on the basis of most-favored-
nation and national treatment principles. Under these agreements, host
countries assume broad obligations for the protection of foreign invest-
ments, particularly against expropriation and strife.
Policies welcoming foreign investments have become a common
feature in developing countries in the last fifteen years after the failure of
attempts to impose some forms of control over the activities of
transnational corporations and the flows of foreign direct investment
(FDI) and technology.2 Investment agreements have been regarded by
* Director, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies on Industrial Property and Economics,
Faculty of Law, University of Buenos Aires. Director of the South Centre project on Intellec-
tual Property and Innovation.
1. RTAs containing rules on investment usually include provisions on the right to
establish a presence in countries members to the RTA, and protection principles found in
BITs. OECD, REGIONALISM AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 65 (2003).
2. Negotiations on a Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations and on an
International Code on Transfer of Technology were launched during the late 1970's, but
collapsed due to the resistance of developed countries. See CARLOS CORREA & NAGESH
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some developing countries as an instrument to attract foreign investors.
The number of BITs quintupled during the last decade, rising from 385
at the end of the 1980s to 1,857 at the end of the 1990s, while the
number of countries involved in bilateral investment treaties reached
173. By 2002, 2,181 BITs had been established. 3 There are more than
172 RTAs in force; a small (albeit growing) minority of them also deal
with investment issues.
Despite expectations about the impact of BITs on FDI, there is no
evidence indicating that the adoption of BITs has actually encouraged
FDI flows to signing developing countries. While half of Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Members' FDI
into developing countries was covered by a BIT by 2000, the increase in
FDI flows to these countries was accounted for by additional country
pairs entering into agreements rather than signatory hosts gaining sig-
nificant additional foreign direct investment.5 BITs, FTAs, and RTAs,
however, permit developed countries who are partners to the agreement
to influence the domestic political economy of developing countries and
to advance the interests of their corporations in the latter markets. The
establishment of BITs and investment rules in FTAs has strategic value
for developed countries, especially the major capital exporters. Though
not all investment agreements ensure market access (to the extent that
pre-establishment rights are not recognized),6 they provide broad post-
establishment rights, including in some cases the possibility of directly
bringing complaints against host States and obtaining compensation.
The United States started to include provisions on intellectual property
KUMAR, ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT: TRADE-RELATED
INVESTMENT MEASURES (TRIM) AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ch. 3 (2003).
3. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. (UNCTAD), WORLD INVEST-
MENT REPORT, 2003, FDI POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES (2003); UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1959-1999 (2000).
4. OECD, supra note 1, at 65.
5. MARY HALLWARD-DRIEMEIER, WORLD BANK DEV. ECON. RESEARCH GROUP, Do
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES ATTRACT FDI? ONLY A BIT ... AND THEY COULD BITE
(2003).
6. See, however, the U.S. Model BIT of 2004, which applies the national treatment
principle to the establishment of foreign investors. Update of U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty (released Feb. 5, 2004), art. 3, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/
38602.htm [hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].
7. The scope and content of BITs have been standardized over the years. The wording
of individual provisions still varies in some cases, while differences are most significant be-
tween BITs signed some decades ago and those signed more recently. The main provisions
deal with the scope and definition of foreign investment; admission and establishment; na-
tional treatment in the post-establishment phase; MFN treatment; fair and equitable treatment;
guarantees and compensation in the event of expropriation; guarantees of free transfers of
funds and repatriations of capital and profits; and dispute settlement provisions, both State-
State and investor-State. See UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, 2003, FDI POLICIES
FOR DEVELOPMENT: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 89 (2003).
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rights (IPRs) in its bilateral investment treaty program during the 1980s;
at that time the United States was also pushing for the negotiation of the
TRIPS Agreement and forcing advanced developing countries, such as
South Korea and Brazil, to bilaterally negotiate higher standards of IPRs
protection.8
OECD countries attempted to develop a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) in the 1990's, but after significant divergences among
OECD countries and opposition from civil society, the initiative col-
lapsed. An attempt is currently underway to incorporate, as one of the
"Singapore issues," investment rules in :the already burdened agenda of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The outcome of the WTO Minis-
terial Conference in Cancun, however, shows a strong resistance by
developing countries to accept new disciplines on investment as a com-
ponent of the WTO system.
While negotiations on intellectual property rights in the WTO are
virtually paralyzed, and the launching of negotiations on investment
finds strong opposition, developed countries, particularly the United
States, have turned to bilateral dealings to advance their industries' eco-
nomic interests and obtain WTO-plus concessions from developing
countries. The United States has concluded BITs9 with a large number of
countries (see Table 1) and several FTAs'0 including rules on investment
(as well as IPRs) with Australia, Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Morocco, and
the Central American countries. There are ongoing negotiations with
Bahrain, the Southern African Customs Union, Thailand, and three An-
dean countries (Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia).
8. Peter Drahos, Expanding Intellectual Property's Empire: The Role of FTAs (No-
vember 2003), available at http://www.grain.org/rights/tripsplus.cfm?id=28.
9. In February 2004, the U.S. State Department released a draft-text of its revised BIT
template that was adopted in November, 2004, supra note 6. The new model BIT includes
extensive transparency commitments on the part of host governments, incorporates a range of
changes to the investor-state dispute settlement process, adds new language to clarify the
meaning of certain substantive provisions, including those on expropriation and the minimum
standard of treatment-in line with earlier U.S. FrAs-includes provisions on labor and the
environment, and contemplates the creation of a future appellate body or mechanism that
would provide a means for review of arbitral awards. See U.S. Releases Draft-Text of Revised
Bilateral Investment Treaty Template, INVEST-SD: INVESTMENT L. AND POL'Y WKLY. NEWS
BULL. (Int'l Inst. on Sustainable Dev., Winnipeg, Can.), Feb. 23, 2004, available at http://
www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment-investsdfeb23-2004.pdf.
10. The Bush Administration also revised the investment template used in U.S. FTAs as
per a series of requirements set down by the U.S. Congress.
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TABLE I
UNITED STATES BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES*
Country Date of Date Entered
.. Signature into Force
Albania .January 11, 1995 January 4, 1998
Argentina November 14,1991 October20,199
Armenia September 23, 1992 March 29, 1996
Azerbaijan I August 1,1997 [ August 2, 2001
'Bahrain September 29, 1999 [ May 30, 2001
Bangladesh March 12,1986 _ July 25,1989
Belarus January 15,1994 [ N/A'
[Bolivia April 17,1998 June 6,2001
Bulgaria September 23, 1992 r June 2, 1994
lCameroon February 26,1986 f April 6,1989
Congo, Democratic August 3, 1984 July 28, 1989
jRepublic of the 2
Congo, Republic of February 12, 1990 August 13, 1994
1the (Brazzaville) 
.
lCroatia July 13, 1996-F June 20, 2001
ICzech Republic 3  October 22, 1991 December 19,1992
Ecuador August27, 1993 May 11, 1997
lEgypt March 11, 1986 June 27, 1992
[El Salvador March 10, 1999 N/A'
jEstonia j April 19, 1994 February 16, 1997
(Georgia March 7, 1994 August 17, 1997
[Grenada May 2,1986 March 3, 1989
Haiti [ December13,1 983 N/A'
Honduras July 1, 1995 July 11,2001
Jamaica I February 4, 1994 March 7, 1997
Jordan July 2, 1997 June 12, 2003
Kazakhstan May 19,1992 F January 12,1994
[Kyrgyzstan I January 19, 1993 1 January 12, 1994
Latvia I January 13,1995 [December26, 1996
Lithuania I January 14,1998 November 22, 2001
Moldova April 21, 1993 November 25, 1994
Mongolia October 6, 1994 January 1, 1997
Morocco July22, 1985 May29, 1991
[Vol. 26:331
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Country Date of Date Entered
Signature into Force
Mozambique December 1, 1998 N.. IA.
Nicaragua July. !. ,1995 N/A6
Panama October 27,1982 May 30, 1991
Panama June 1, 2000 May 14, 2001
(Amendment)
Poland .... March 21, 1990 August 6,1994
!Romania May 28,1992 . January 15,1994
Russia June 17,1992 N/A'
Senegal December 6,1983 October 25, 1990
,Slovakia' October 22, 1991 December 19,1992
Sri Lanka September 20, 1991 May 1,1993
[Trinidad & Tobago September 26, 1994 1December 26,1996;
Tunisia May 15,1990 February 7,1993
Turkey December 3,1985 May 18,1990
Ukraine March 4, 1994 November 16,1996
'zbekistan .December 16, 1994 N/A'
'Source: Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Fact Sheet.,
1 U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, Washington, DC., July
1,o2003
Although investment agreements do not include detailed regulations
on IPR, they incorporate a broad definition of "investment" that gener-
ally covers such rights. Such agreements may thus influence the exercise
of IPRs laws and in particular the capacity of host countries to control
the acquisition and use of IPRs by foreign title-holders.
Can the exercise of any of the key provisions in investment
agreements" lead to rights and practices that deviate from the terms of
the TRIPS Agreement? This issue is specifically explored in relation to
compulsory licenses,'2 one of the "safeguards" contemplated in the
TRIPS Agreement that developing countries have actively tried to
11. There has been no attempt to review the large number of investment agreements
adopted or in force. The study is based rather on a sample of provisions identified in agree-
ments entered into with different developed countries. Given the extensive use of "model" BIT
agreements and of pre-existing FTAs to negotiate new ones, it is expected that the study will
provide a fairly comprehensive analysis of the subject.
12. This discussion is also relevant for cases of non-commercial government use of
IPRs.
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preserve in order to mitigate the powers conferred to patent owners.13
Despite this attention and interest, no single compulsory license has been
granted in a developing country after the adoption of the TRIPS
Agreement. This article explores the extent to which investment
protection may add another barrier for such a use and how to deal with
this problem. Part II examines the definition of "investment" and the
modalities of IPRs included therein. Part III briefly deals with the
application of the national treatment, most-favored-nation, and the "fair
and equitable" principles. Part IV identifies issues emerging from the
potential application of expropriation rules to compulsory licenses, and
Part V discusses conclusions that can be drawn from these issues.
II. WHAT QUALIFIES AS AN "INVESTMENT"?
A. Assets as Investment
As contained in BITs, the Energy Charter Treaty, the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and recently negotiated FTAs,
"investment" is an all-encompassing concept including almost any kind
of business activity. The definition of "investment" is generally based on
the concept of asset. All assets of an enterprise, such as movable and
immovable property, equity in companies, claims to money, contractual
rights, intellectual property rights, concessions, licenses and similar
rights are included. This concept is broader than FDI, as it encompasses
portfolio investments.1 4 Box 1 contains, as an example, the definition of
"investment" incorporated into the recent Chile-United States FTA.
13. See, e.g., Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Con-
ference, Fourth Session, Doha, Nov. 9-14 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/minOl_e/mindecle.pdf, which
confirmed the right to issue compulsory licenses and determine the grounds thereof.
14. See UNCTAD WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND IN-
TERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS at 174, U.N. Sales No. E.96.H.A.14 (1996). Some
agreements, however, are limited to foreign direct investments. See, e.g., the agreement be-
tween EFTA and Mexico of 2000, which applies to "investment for the purpose of establishing
lasting economic relations with an undertaking such as, in particular, investments which give
the possibility of exercising an effective influence on the management thereof." Free Trade
Agreement Between EFTA and Mexico, Nov. 27, 2000, EFTA-Mex., art. 45, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/mexefta/mexefta.asp.
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Box i
INVESTMENT UNDER THE CHILE-USA FTA
INVESTMENT INCLUDES:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an
enterprise;
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans;
(d) futures, options and other derivatives;
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession,
revenue-sharing and other similar contracts;
(f) intellectual property rights;
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits and similar rights con-
ferred pursuant to applicable domestic law, and
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable prop-
erty, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages,
liens, and pledges.
Some investment agreements generally refer to IPRs, while others
explicitly indicate the types of covered IPRs. For instance, the BIT be-
tween the United States and El Salvador specifies that "investment"
includes "copyrights and related rights, patents, rights in plant varieties,
industrial designs, rights in semiconductor layout designs, trade secrets,
including know-how and confidential business information, trade and
service marks, and trade names.'
'
1
5
In some investment agreements, reference is also made to "technical
process"'6 or "know how"'7 and "goodwill."'" An open question is the
15. U.S.-El Salvador Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. I(d), Mar. 10, 1999, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/bits/usasal-e.asp.
16. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments, art. I(a)(iv), Jan. -4, 1996, available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk-azerbaijan.pdf ("goodwill, technical processes
and know-how").
17. See, e.g., Agreement Between EFrA and Singapore, June 26, 2002, EFTA-Sing.,
art. 37, available at http://secretariat.efta.intWeb/ExtemalRelations/PartnerCountfies/
Singapore [hereinafter EFTA-Singapore BIT] ("technical know-how and goodwill").
18. According to current IPRs law, secret "technical process" or "know how" may be
protected as trade secrets or undisclosed information. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
Fall 20041
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extent to which modalities of IPRs not existing at the time of entry into
an investment agreement (such as plant varieties protection)' 9 would be
covered investments. An affirmative reply to this question may be
grounded on the fact that investment agreements are intended to protect
current and future investments, or on the application of catch-all provi-
sions embracing (such as in the example above) any other "intangible
property."
Investment agreements protect assets under the direct or indirect
control of foreign investors. National laws differ on what "control"
means. There is no international standard to judge when certain types of
rights, or even a de facto situation, may be considered as equivalent to an
actual control over assets. In addition to the difficulties in determining
when control exists, a broad concept of "indirect" ownership or control
may lead to the protection of investors who lack a substantial business
activity in the host country, such as when an investment is made by a
firm established in another contracting party but owned or controlled by
a party in a non-contracting party.20
Given the broad coverage of these definitions, some investment
agreements, like NAFTA Chapter 11,21 include a general rule accompa-
nied by an illustrative list of covered investments, as well as a "negative"
list of areas specifically excluded from the scope of the agreement.22 In
the negotiation of the draft MAI, a proposal was made to include an in-
terpretive note indicating that in order to qualify as an investment,
certain characteristics must be present, such as the commitment of capi-
tal or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption
of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 39, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 31 I.L.M. 81, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips e/
t agmOe.htm [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. "Goodwill" is the benefit and advantage of the
good name, reputation, and connection of a business. It may be protected under unfair compe-
tition law (which condemns dishonest commercial practices) or, in common-law countries,
under the doctrine of "passing-off' (the wrong of misrepresenting one's business goods or
services as another's, to the latter's injury, generally by using a confusingly similar trademark
or trade name). Protection often encompasses not only the use of trademarks, but also of a
particular packaging, "get up" or "trade dress," and advertising styles.
19. Most developing countries that introduced plant variety protection did it during the
last ten years, in some cases after having entered into FrAs; Mexico is one example.
20. This issue was discussed during the negotiation of the draft MAI. See OECD Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment-Commentary to the MAI Negotiating Text 5 (Apr. 24,
1998) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/27/2758531 
.pdf.
21. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1994, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art.
1101.2, 32 I.L.M. 289, [hereinafter NAFrA].
22. Id.
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of risk.23 This characterization appears in recent FTAs such as in the
Chile-United States FTA and in the U.S. Model BIT.24
These characteristics would exclude from the definition trade opera-
tions and financial transactions as such.25 Claims to money and any form
of credit may be covered assets, however; therefore, the definition would
apply to the rights arising from trade transactions or from bank opera-
tions, including bank deposits. Moreover, case law under NAFITA seems
to indicate the troubling trend of considering some of those features as
sufficient to define, by themselves, when a covered investment exists;
one example is when the expectation of a market share is frustrated. In
S.D. Myers v. Canada the Tribunal ruled the scope of "investment" in-
cludes such assets as market share in a sector and access to markets in
the host state, whether or not the investor owns a physical plant or retail
store in that country. In short, almost any kind of business activity can
constitute an investment that is subject to protection."
B. IPRs as Investment
IPRs are deemed an "investment" in investment agreements, which
generally include a specific reference to that effect. In the absence of
exceptions or other specifications, 8 the usual broad "assets" definition
would cover any type of IPRs acquired in the host country, including
those that are not specifically dealt with under the TRIPS Agreement. 9 A
number of questions may arise with regard to the scope of the definition.
Unregistered IPRs such as copyright and trade secret protection do
not require registration to confer rights against third parties. The lack of
23. Manfred Schekulin, Scope of the MAI: Definition of Investor and Investment, in
THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: STATE OF PLAY AS OF FEBRUARY 1997 12
(OECD Working Papers v. 5, no. 18, 1997).
24. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6.
25. See, e.g, the clarification contained in the Canada-Costa Rica BIT. Canada-Costa
Rica Bilateral Investment Treaty, Mar. 18, 1998, art. 1, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
bitse.asp#CAN.
26. S.D. Myers v. Canada, para. 232, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Nov. 13, 2000, available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/SDM-archive-en.asp (stating, in a NAFTA arbitra-
tion under UNCITRAL arbitration rules, that Myers' market share in Canada constituted an
investment). See also Pope Talbot v. Canada, para. 96, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Apr. 10, 2001,
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/pope-archive-en.asp (defining access
to U.S. markets by a foreign investment as a protected property interest).
27. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (IISD), PRIVATE
RIGHTS, PUBLIC PROBLEMS-A GUIDE TO NAFTA's CONTROVERSIAL CHAPTER ON INVESTOR
RIGHTS 23 (2001).
28. For instance, during discussions of the draft MAI, some delegations proposed ex-
cluding copyrights and neighboring rights, as well as databases. See MAI, supra note 20, at
117.
29. Examples include utility models, breeders' rights, data bases, and digital manage-
ment rights.
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registration does not seem to affect the status of such rights as covered
investments. As noted, some BITs and FTAs explicitly mention these
categories of non-registered rights.
Certain IPRs require the holder to apply for them; patents, trade-
marks, industrial designs, and other IPRs can only be acquired through a
registration process, upon demand by the interested party. 30 The right is
conferred once the application is processed and approved. Thus, a patent
application creates a mere expectation of obtaining an exclusive right
and, hence, a profit. Patent applications, however, may be traded and, in
some countries, patent applications generate rights even before they are
granted, such as the ability to act against infringers. Though it is clear
that a still-unregistered invention is not an IPR, it may be argued that the
application is, in any case, an "intangible property" as long as it is
"owned" and can be assigned to third parties. Further, some investment
agreements 3' refer in the definition of "investment" to "rights with re-
spect to copyrights, patents .... This wording may be intended to
encompass not only granted rights but also applications.
A third area at issue in IPRs involves cases in which the subject mat-
ter is unprotected in the host country but is protected elsewhere. This
situation may arise when, for example: (a) the IPR owner in a foreign
country has not claimed his rights in the host country3 3; (b) the IPRs have
expired or have been revoked in the host country, while still valid in for-
eign countries; or (c) the subject matter is deemed not protectable in the
host country, such as in the case of countries applying the exception al-
lowed by Article 27. 3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement for plant and animals
or refusing patents on merely isolated genes.
Because IPRs are granted on a territorial basis, subject matter ex-
cluded from protection in a country belongs to the public domain there.
It cannot be deemed an asset owned or controlled by a juridical or natu-
ral person. In the case of well known trademarks, however, which receive
protection without prior registration, Article 16.2 of the TRIPs Agree-
30. It should be noted that in countries of common law tradition, trademarks may be
acquired simply by use of the sign, without formal registration.
31. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the Republic of Argentina for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 5,
1991, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/bitse.asp#ARG.
32. Id., art. 1 (a)(iv); cf with, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Canada and
the Government of Barbados for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, art.
l(f)(v), May 29, 1996, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/bitse.asp#CAN (defining "invest-
ment" as including IPR, and IPR as including "copyright and related rights" as well as other
rights).
33. This is a very common situation. For instance, developing countries only receive a
fraction (in some cases a very minor one) of patent applications made in the United States or
Europe. See WIPO Industrial Property Statistics, available at http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/.
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ment is one exception. Recent FTAs have not only confirmed this excep-
tion but expanded it beyond the TRIPS standard, by incorporation of
WIPO's Joint Recommendation on provisions relating to well-known
trademarks.34
III. THE APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES: NATIONAL
TREATMENT, MOST-FAVORED NATION, AND
"FAIR AND EQUITABLE"
A. The National Treatment Principle
The national treatment principle is well established in IPRs law.
Since the adoption of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Indus-
trial Property in 1883, it has become a standard feature in most
international agreements35 on IPRs as well as of most national IPRs
laws.3 6 It is also incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement.
3 7
The adoption of the national treatment principle in the TRIPS
Agreement as well as in other international agreements on IPRs (such as
the Paris, Berne, and Rome Conventions, as well as the Washington
Treaty), however, is subject to a number of carefully negotiated and
38drafted exceptions. In contrast, no exceptions have been contemplated
in investments agreements, even though conceivably they would be
needed to protect particular interests of contracting parties.
For instance, according to Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the na-
tional treatment principle only applies "in respect of performers,
producers of phonograms, and broadcasting organizations with regard to
34. WIPO JOINT RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING TRADEMARK LICENSES (Oct. 3,
2000), available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development iplaw/index.htm. See, e.g.,
Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Chile, Chile-U.S., Jan. 1, 2004, art. 17.2.9, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/chiusa-e/chiusaind-e.asp#
2 3
.
35. A noticeable exception is the UPOV Convention, which adopted a reciprocity prin-
ciple. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 1, 1961,
revised Oct. 23, 1978, art. 3, available at http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/
1978/w-up780_.htm.
36. Some laws, however, require reciprocity. See, e.g., U.S. Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act (SCPA), 17 U.S.C. 901ff, 902(a)(2) (1984) (although the U.S. law in this respect
was superseded by the TRIPS Agreement, which requires Members to grant national treat-
ment).
37. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 3.
38. See, e.g., id. at art. 3.1 ("Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other
Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to
the protection of intellectual property, subject to the exceptions ... provided in ... the Paris
Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits....")
Fall 20041
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the rights provided under this Agreement."39 This means that Members
may discriminate with regard to other rights, such as the participation of
local and foreign performers in funds generated by levies on blank tapes.
It is unclear the extent to which an exception of this type would survive
the all-encompassing national treatment principle as applied in the con-
text of investment agreements. Could a foreign performer successfully
claim that denial of national treatment discriminates him as an "investor"?
It may be argued that protected rights are only those conferred under the
domestic law. The solution to this and similar cases may remain an open
question until the issue is clarified by case law.
B. The Most-Favored-Nation Clause
The Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause was not present in pre-
TRIPS international conventions on IPRs. It was incorporated in Article
4 of the TRIPS Agreement with a number of exceptions.40 This provision
means, for instance, that should most-advantageous conditions be
granted to the members of a regional agreement (established after the
entry into force of the WTO Agreement), such conditions must be ex-
tended, automatically and unconditionally, to all WTO Members.
The MFN clause in the context of investment agreements obliges the
host country to extend to investors from the contracting party treatment
no less favorable than it accords to investors from other countries. Dif-
ferent formulations of this clause may be found in investment
agreements. While the MFN clause aims at creating equality of competi-
tive opportunities between investors from different foreign countries, it
limits host countries' room for maneuvering with respect to future in-
vestment agreements, as it obliges a host country to extend unilaterally
to investors from treaty partners any additional rights that that host coun-
try grants to third countries in future agreements. 4'
39. Id.
40. Id. at art. 4 ("Exempted from the MFN obligation are any advantage, favor, privi-
lege or immunity accorded by a Member: "(a) deriving from international agreements onjudicial assistance and law enforcement of a general nature and not particularly confined to
the protection of intellectual property; (b) granted in accordance with the provisions of the
Berne Convention (1971) or the Rome Convention authorizing that the treatment accorded be
a function not of national treatment but of the treatment accorded in another country; (c) in
respect of the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations
not provided under this Agreement; (d) deriving from international agreements related to the
protection of intellectual property which entered into force prior to the entry into force of the
Agreement Establishing the WTO, provided that such agreements are notified to the Council
for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and do not constitute an arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination against nationals of other Members.").
41. UNCTAD, MOST FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT - UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS VOL. 1115 (1999).
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Most agreements refer to "treatment no less favorable." NAFTA 4'2
and the U.S. Model BIT 3 include the qualification that such treatment
applies only "in like circumstances."" Many investment agreements enti-
tle both foreign investors and their investments to MFN . Others (e.g.,
U.S. BITs) only grant MFN to the investment. Still another approach has
been followed in the French Model BIT, which gives MFN to the inves-
tors with regard to their investments.46
The vast majority of BITs does not include binding provisions relat-
ing to the pre-establishment (admission) phase, but only apply after an
investment has been made. Most BITs of the United States and some
recent treaties of Canada, however, require the application of the MFN
treatment to both the pre- and post-establishment phases.47
The MFN as applied to IPRs in the context of investment agreements
implies that any future concession made will apply to IPRs holders pro-
tected under current investment agreements, even if the latter provide for
narrower rights. In particular, the MFN clause may nullify the advan-
tages obtained by specifying exceptions to certain rights in a particular
agreement, as investors may be able to invoke such a clause to claim
broader rights.
C. Fair and Equitable Treatment
The MFN clause sets forth a contingent, relative standard of invest-
ment protection. Many investment agreements also contain absolute
standards, 48 such as "reasonable" or "fair and equitable" treatment, 49 gen-
erally with regard to the post-establishment phase.
Though the wording of this standard is ambiguous and may allow
different interpretations, the standard provides a rule against which the
42. NAFTA, supra note 21, at art. 1103.
43. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art. 4.
44. Although GATr/WTO jurisprudence on "like goods" may illustrate how this issue
could be tackled, it does not provide concrete guidance for interpreting the "like circum-
stances" concept in the context of investment rules.
45. For examples, see NAFrA, supra note 21, and various BITs concluded by Germany,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
46. UNCTAD, supra note 41, at 6.
47. See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art. 4.1.
48. For a distinction between "relative" and "absolute" standards, see UNCTAD, supra
note 14, at 182.
49. For example, the United States-El Salvador BIT provides that "each Party shall at
all times accord to covered investments fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security, and shall in no case accord treatment less favorable than that required by
international law." Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of El Salvador for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection
of Investment, Mar. 10, 1999, El Salvador-U.S., art. II.3(a), available at htsp:/
www.sice.oas.org/bitse.asp#ESV.
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policies and regulations of contracting parties would be judged. In some
cases, the provisions relating to "fair and equitable" treatment in invest-
ment agreements are supplemented by an obligation not to impair
investments by "unreasonable" and/or "discriminatory" measures. Under
the U.S. Model BIT, this principle is also meant to include the obligation
not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory pro-
ceedings "in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in
the principal legal systems of the world."50
Could a "fair and reasonable" standard be invoked in order to chal-
lenge national IPRs laws consistent with the TRIPS Agreement?
Investors are subject in each contracting party to the regulations and
policies generally applicable to the type of investment they hold or of
activity they undertake. As stated by one commentator in relation to the
draft OECD MAI, the "fair and equitable" standard cannot be deemed as
"designed to forbid any form of regulation against foreign investors, but
only discriminatory policies."5 In other words, this standard should not
be used to "challenge the legitimacy of a public action"5 2 or a regulation
connected with IPRs consistent with the applicable international rules as
well as with national laws if not discriminatory.
It is to be noted that differentiation in legal treatment is not the same as
discrimination, and that WTO members can adopt different rules for par-
ticular areas, provided that the differences are adopted for bona fide
purposes. A WTO panel held in this regard that:
Article 27 prohibits only discrimination as to the place of inven-
tion, the field of technology, and whether products are imported
or produced locally. Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide ex-
ceptions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain
product areas. Moreover, to the extent the prohibition of dis-
crimination does limit the ability to target certain products in
dealing with certain of the important national policies referred to
in Articles 7 and 8.1, that fact may well constitute a deliberate
limitation rather than frustration of purpose."
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health54
may be considered as authorizing differentiation in intellectual property
50. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art. 5.2(a).
51. Valerie Charolles, Treatment of Investors and Their Investments: National Treat-
ment, Most-Favoured Nation Treatment, and Transparency, in THE MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT, supra note 23, at 19.
52. Id.
53. See Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products: Com-
plaint by the European Communities and Their Member States, Mar. 17, 2000, WTO Doc.
WT/DS I 14/R 7.92.
54. Doha Declaration, supra note 13.
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rules if necessary to protect public health." Curiously, recent FTAs sub-
scribed to by the United States reproduce only part of Article 27.1 and
omit the non-discrimination clause contained therein. 6 A possible expla-
nation for this is that such treaties incorporate conditions that benefit, in
particular, pharmaceutical companies, such as restoration of the patent
term with respect to any pharmaceutical product to compensate the pat-
ent owner for unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term as a
result of the marketing approval process.57 Similar rights are not avail-
able for patents covering agrochemical products or genetically modified
organisms, though they also require approval for commercialization.
5 8
D. Compulsory Licenses Under Investment Agreements
The adoption of the TRIPS Agreement was regarded by developing
countries as the end of a process of strengthening of IPRs protection.
They expected that in exchange for consenting to high IPRs standards,
they would be protected from unilateral actions and further demands of
increased levels of IPRs protection by rich countries. Shortly, after the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, however, the European Union and the
United States continued to use various means to put pressure on develop-
ing countries not only to implement the TRIPS Agreement standards, but to
obtain "TRIPS-plus" protection, that is, levels of protection beyond the
minimum standards required by the TRIPS Agreement. Unilateral pressure
was exerted, for instance, by threatening the removal of trade prefer-
ences or cuts in development aid, or through simple moral persuasion. In
other cases, and without any assessment of its development implications,
including those implications for sensitive areas such as public health, de-
veloping countries have been persuaded to adopt "TRIPS-plus" standards
in order to benefit from other trade concessions under bilateral agreements.
The European Union promoted and signed a number of bilateral agree-
ments expanding the protection of IPRs, while the United States did not
dismantle its controversial Special Section 301 of the Trade Act, 9 which
55. See, e.g., CARLOS CORREA, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH 9, 18, 41(2002).
56. See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment (CAFTA), art. 15.9.1, not yet in force, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/
CAFrA/CAFTADRe/CAFIADRine.asp.
57. See, e.g., id. at art. 15.10.2.
58. In the case of the approval of GMOs for food, for instance, the European Communi-
ties apply a de facto moratorium since 1998. See, e.g., Clear Labeling of GMOs, available at,
http://www.elections2004.eu.int/highlights/en/709.html.
59. A WTO panel examined, in a case initiated by the EC and their Member States, the
consistency with WTO obligations of the authorization given to the U.S. government to retaliate
under several provisions (such as "Special 301") of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19
U.S.C § 2114c(2)(A) (1984). Because of a commitment by the U.S. government not to apply
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empowers the U.S. Trade Representative to initiate cases even against
countries compliant with the TRIPS standards.6°
Inherent to most intellectual property rights is the granting of exclu-
sive rights. Exclusive rights give the right holder the legal power to
prevent third parties from using, producing, or commercializing the pro-
tected invention, sign, or work. Such power, however, is not absolute.
Exceptions to exclusive rights are a typical feature in intellectual prop-
erty laws. They generally specify certain categories of acts that third
parties are allowed to undertake without the authorization of the right
holder. The permitted acts include, for instance, the use of an invention
for private purposes, for teaching, and for scientific research. In many
countries the experimentation for commercial purposes is an additional
permissible purpose. In the case of pharmaceutical patents, some coun-
tries specifically permit to initiate the procedures for the registration of a
medicine by a third party before the date of expiry of the respective pat-
ents, so as to speed up the commercialization of a generic product after
that date.61
These exceptions to exclusive rights operate automatically, that is,
there is no need to request authorization from a court or other authority
to use the protected subject matter. In addition, any party can benefit
from an exception at any time, and its application is not subject to any
compensation. States' right to establish exceptions of this type was rec-
ognized by the TRIPS Agreement.62
Compulsory licenses also limit the exercise of intellectual property
rights, but they do not work in the same way as the exceptions referred
to above. A compulsory license is an authorization given by the govern-
ment for the use by a third party, without the consent of the right-owner, of
a patent or other intellectual property rights. A compulsory license allows
the use of protected subject matter, but only by the person who has been
so permitted by an authority (court or administration), after determina-
tion that certain requirements established by the law are met. Both the
request for a compulsory license and its use may be subject to time re-
strictions and other conditions, as well as to the payment of
compensation to the right holder.
sanctions without WTO authorization, the panel did not find a violation of WTO obligations. Panel
Report, United States-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Dec. 22, 1999, VTO Doc.
WT/DS I52/R DSR2000:II, 815.
60. See the "Special 301" section of the U.S. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C
§ 2114c(2)(A) (1984).
61. This exception is usually known as "early working" or the "Bolar exception." It was
first introduced by U.S. law in 1984. Cf with Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical
Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
62. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at arts. 13, 17, 30.
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Governments may also decide to use a patented invention for non-
commercial purposes, either by itself or through a subcontractor. The
non-commercial government use (hereinafter "government use") is com-
parable in many respects to compulsory licenses, but the procedures for
using the invention are simpler than in the case of a request of a compul-
sory license by a third party.
National patent laws63 of most countries in the world have recog-
nized compulsory licenses for a multiplicity of purposes (such as
remedying non-working and other abuses, remedying anti-competitive
practices, public interest, emergency, public health, etc.). Some develop-
ing countries, however, have faced the threat of unilateral trade
retaliations or the suspension of foreign aid due to the adoption of rules
on compulsory licenses. Thee dispute between the United States and
South Africa relating to South African legislation on parallel imports and
compulsory licenses is one example of this6; the challenge launched by
the United States in January 2001 against Brazilian legislation, legisla-
tion that authorized the granting of compulsory licenses and parallel
imports in instances when patents are not worked domestically, is an-
other.6 The dispute ended several months later 66 when the U.S. complaint
was withdrawn.67
The granting and effective exploitation of a compulsory license may
limit the economic benefits that the patent holder may obtain from his
"investment." An important question is whether the granting of a com-
pulsory license may, under an investment agreement, be deemed an
expropriation that could trigger legal actions against the host State and
compensation claims.
63. Though the analysis in this paper is focused on patent law, many considerations
made here apply, mutatis mutandi, to other fields where compulsory licenses are also provided
for, such as breeders' rights and copyright.
64. See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).
65. See Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 8, 2001). On
February 1, 2001, the DSB authorized establishment of a panel, although no panel members
had been appointed by the time the complaint was withdrawn.
66. Without prejudice to their respective positions, the United States and Brazil agreed
to enter into bilateral discussions before Brazil makes use of Article 68 against a U.S. patent
holder. Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solu-
tion, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4, WTO Doc.G/L/454, WTO Doc. IP/D/23/Add.1 (July 19,
2001).
67. Interestingly, BITs signed by the EFTA States recognize the legitimacy of compul-
sory licenses for non-working. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the EFTA States and
the Kingdom of Morocco, June 19, 1997, art. 3, available at http://secretariat.efta.int/
Web/ExtemalRelations/PartnerCountries/Morocco (providing that compulsory licenses
"granted on the grounds of nonworking shall be used only to the extent necessary to satisfy
the domestic market on reasonable commercial terms").
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Expropriation clauses are among the key provisions in investment
agreements. The scope of these clauses is not limited only to direct and
full takings of property. For instance, the Germany - Bangladesh BIT
includes in its protocol, section 3, "the taking away or restricting of any
property right which in itself or in conjunction with other rights consti-
tutes an investment. '6' Article 42.1 of the EFTA-Singapore agreement
stipulates that "[n]one of the Parties shall take, either de jure or de facto,
measures of expropriation or nationalization against investments of in-
vestors of another Party.. .,,69 The U.S. Model BIT indicates that
"neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either
directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or
nationalization. 7°
A critical issue is to determine whether a compulsory license may be
deemed an expropriation. A compulsory license does not transfer the
property of the affected patent/s; it provides, as mentioned, an exception
to exclusive rights. The fact that no transfer of property takes place will
not be sufficient to disregard a possible qualification of expropriation.
For instance, "the slow and incremental encroachment on one or more of
the ownership rights of a foreign investor that diminishes the value of its
investment" (though the property remains vested in the foreign investor)
is often considered "creeping expropriation.,'
Can a compulsory license be considered a de facto or indirect ex-
propriation?72 Compulsory licenses are not expressly intended to take
private property but may have an equivalent effect, that is, they may af-
fect the viability or substantially diminish the value of the investment.
The determination of whether a measure amounts to a de facto or indi-
rect expropriation must be made case-by-case. The mere fact that a
measure has an adverse economic effect on an investment, standing
alone, does not establish that a de facto or indirect expropriation has oc-
culfed.73 Moreover, if the compulsory license is the development of the
68. Germany-Bangladesh Bilateral Investment Agreement, May 6, 1981, prot. 3, Ger-
many-Bangladesh, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_
bangladesh.pdf (emphasis added).
69. EFTA-Singapore BIT, supra note 17. U.S. BITs also include a clause stipulating
that "neither Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable and discriminatory measures the
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of covered investments." See
U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6.
70. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art 6.
71. UNCTAD, TAKING OF PROPERTY 12 (2000).
72. NAFTA, for instance, prohibits three types of expropriation: direct expropriation,
indirect expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation. NAFTA, supra note 21, at
art. 1110. The cases to date have held that these last two terms have the same meaning:
measures that do not directly take investment property, but which amount to the same thing.
IISD, supra note 27, at 31.
73. See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at Ann. B, 4(a)(i).
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legitimate exercise of the State's regulatory power, there is no indication
that the measure has an illicit purpose or it is discriminatory, and com-
pensation is available, then the measure could not be objected to. This
will be the case if the license is granted in accordance with Article 31 of
the TRIPS Agreement.
A compulsory license thus cannot be rightly described as an act of
expropriation. But the broad definition of "investment" and the coverage
of de facto expropriation may be used to raise an expropriation com-
plaint in case a compulsory license were granted, and thereby challenge
the legitimacy of the grant or of the compensation established on the ba-
sis of rules applicable to compulsory licenses.
If such a claim were made, a first important issue would be to de-
termine how the "public interest" would be defined. "Public interest" is a
concept broader than ordre public as utilized in the TRIPS Agreement
and many patent laws. The concept of ordre public covers the protection
of the public and of the physical integrity of individuals. It may also be
deemed to encompass the protection of the environment.74 Measures "in
the public interest" concern not only the protection of the public but any
actions that governments deem necessary or convenient to achieve public
policy objectives, in the area of health, education, etc. and, more broadly,
to foster economic and social development. 5
There may be little doubt that a compulsory license granted to address
a public health emergency or anti-competitive practices is "in the public
interest." Other grounds, such as the lack of or insufficient working of a
patent or refusal to deal, also reflect the "public interest." Allowing or en-
hancing competition and increasing the supply of a given product are
public interest objectives. Any ground defined by the national patent law76
for granting compulsory licenses should, as a matter of principle, be re-
garded as a matter of public interest in line with customary international
74. Frd~ric Pollaud-Dulian, La Brevetabilitg des Inventions: Etude Comparative de
Jurisprudence, 16 LE DROIT DES AFFAIRES 173 (1997).
75. NAFTA jurisprudence has diluted, however, the importance of the purpose of the
measure that affects an investment. In Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 16 ICSID
Rev.-FILJ 168, para. 103 (2001), the tribunal considered only the scale of impact of the chal-
lenged measure on an investment and whether there was a significant impact on "the use or
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property, even if not necessarily to the obvious
benefit of the host State." The same approach is developed in the Pope Talbot v. Canada deci-
sion. See IISD, supra note 27, at 32.
76. It is to be noted, in this context, that the TRIPS Agreement does not restrict the
grounds for the granting of compulsory licenses. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 31.
Bilateral agreements, such as the United States-Jordan BIT, however, do restrict the admissi-
ble grounds for granting such licenses. Treaty Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Concerning the En-
couragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, July 2, 1997, art. 4.20, U.S.-Jordan,
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/usjordan.pdf.
Fall 2004]
Michigan Journal of International Law
law. A host country's determination of what is in the public interest or a
77public purpose is seldom challenged in expropriation cases.
There will be no discrimination if a patent or set of patents are sin-
gled out for the granting of a compulsory license because, by its very
essence, a patent covers a unique process or product. Discrimination
complaints may be raised, however, with regard to due process and pay-
ment of compensation.
If expropriation rules were applicable to cases of compulsory li-
censes, a further question would be whether the patent owner could as an
"investor" claim compensation different from or in addition to the one
provided for by the patent law, presumably in line with Article 31 (h) of
the TRIPS Agreement.
The compensation that the patent owner may receive under compul-
sory licenses rules should be "adequate" in "the circumstances of each
case" and would be determined on the basis of the "economic value" of
the license .79 The compensation is to be paid by the compulsory licensee
or, in the case of non-commercial use, by the government. In the case of
expropriation, the compensation should be, in accordance with the Hull
standard incorporated by most investment agreements, "prompt, ade-
quate, and effective,"8 and is payable by the government.
If the patent owner is compensated according to the current eco-
nomic value of the license, however, the compensation would be
"adequate" and it is difficult to conceive that the patent owner could suc-
ceed in a claim about adequateness. In fact, the extent to which a
compulsory license may diminish the value of the patent will depend on
a variety of factors." Loss of value will not be automatic, and may not
occur at all if compulsory licenses increase the global demand for the
patented product, or if the royalties received compensate for the losses
originated by the compulsory licensee's competition. Compulsory li-
censes must be non-exclusive 2; this means that the patent owner can
77. UNCTAD, supra note 71, at 13, 25.
78. Id. at 13.
79. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 31 (h).
80. According to the current U.S. Model BIT, for instance, compensation shall "(a) be
paid without delay; (b) be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment
immediately before the expropriation took place ... and (d) be fully realizable and freely
transferable[ .... ] The fair market value shall not reflect any change in value occurring be-
cause the intended appropriation had become known earlier" U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at
art. 6.2.
81. In Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, the tribunal noted that "not all government regula-
tory activity that makes it difficult or impossible for an investor to carry out a particular
business, change in the law or change in the application of existing laws that makes it uneco-
nomical to continue a particular business, is an expropriation under Article 1110 [of
NAFTA]... "Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, 18 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 488, para. 112 (2003).
82. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 3 1(d).
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continue with the exploitation of the invention and can compete, as ag-
gressively as it wishes, with the compulsory licensee, with the
advantages conferred by the prestige of brand names and generally
abundant resources for marketing. In fact, the market share that compul-
sory licensees may obtain may be small and even insignificant, on
account of the reputation and dominant presence of the patent owner in
the market.83 Moreover, given the characteristics of competition in some
markets such as, for example, pharmaceuticals, high-priced brand-name
goods (e.g., medicines) often perform commercially better than their
low-priced equivalents.
Licenses to remedy anti-competitive practices are subject to special
treatment with regard to the remuneration to be paid to the patent-holder.
Article 31 (k) may be interpreted by national authorities as allowing for
a reduced remuneration, as established in some cases in the United
States.M It is also to be noted that a taking or expropriation "in response
to a violation of penal or other laws of a host country is legitimate and is
not compensable, as compensation will negate the punitive purpose be-
hind such takings."85
While it may be difficult to make arguments about adequateness if
the TRIPS standards are complied with, more controversial may be an
argument about promptness because, in practice, the compensation for a
compulsory license has been generally established in the form of a roy-
alty payable over time as sales of the licensed product take place.86 The
standard of prompt compensation, however, may be interpreted as re-
quiring payment without unreasonable delay, but not necessarily an up-
front payment.
Finally, the procedures for granting a compulsory license should en-
sure the patent owner at least the right to appeal the validity of the
decision granting the license and the determination of the compensa-
tion.87 If such appeal is provided for, it may be difficult to substantiate a
complaint about due process.
The possibility of challenging compulsory licenses on the basis of
investors' rights has been anticipated by some agreements. For instance,
the FTA between Chile and the United States stipulates that the provi-
sion on expropriation and compensation:
83. Jayashree Watal, Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices, and Welfare Losses: Policy Op-
tions for India Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement, in 23 THE WORLD ECON., 733 (May, 2000).
84. See, e.g., SOL GOLDSTEIN, A STUDY OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 124 (1977).
85. UNCTAD, supra note 71, at 14.
86. The payment of a lump sum, however, is in no way excluded as a possible form of
remuneration.
87. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 18, at art. 31(i)-(j).
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does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in
relation to intellectual property rights in accordance with the
TRIPS Agreement, or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of
intellectual property rights, to the extent that such revocation,
limitation, or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen (In-
tellectual Property Rights).
The incorporation of this provision confirms that expropriation rules are
potentially applicable to the granting of compulsory licenses. An excep-
tion of this type is also contained in the U.S. Model BIT. 9
IV. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property rights, registered or not, are protected invest-
ments under BITs and trade agreements that incorporate rules on
investment. This adds another layer of treaty-based protection onto rights
protected under the TRIPS Agreement and other international conven-
tions. But this protection goes beyond TRIPS, because investment
agreements apply to rights not covered by the TRIPS Agreement and
incorporate the national treatment principle clause without the excep-
tions provided for under IPR treaties.
It is unclear the extent to which rights granted by investment agree-
ments may be used to substantiate claims in the area of IPRs. An area of
particular concern may be the granting of compulsory licenses, because
the patent owner would be normally able to claim an economic loss, de-
spite the fact that the patent rights will continue in force and that he will
be able to compete with the compulsory licensees.
Expropriation rules, if found applicable to a compulsory license,
may be more beneficial to the patent owner than the compulsory licenses
rules, particularly because the obligation to pay will rest with the gov-
ernment and because investment agreements normally provide for the
investor's right to directly sue the State.
Though it may be difficult for an affected patent owner to claim that
an illegal expropriation has taken place if the rules of the TRIPS Agree-
ment (notably Article 31) were complied with, cases may arise in which
claims of this type could be made (for instance, when a patent owner
were dissatisfied with the determination of the level or mode of compen-
sation). Given the gray area that overlapping protections create,
investor's rights may be used to dissuade governments from using com-
pulsory licenses. It would seem, therefore, advisable in investment
88. Chile-U.S. FTA, supra note 34, at art. 10.9.5.
89. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 6, at art. 6.5.
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agreements to provide specifically for an exception stipulating that com-
pulsory licenses are not subject to expropriation and compensation rules,
and to ensure that the application of that exception is not excluded or
undermined by rights conferred under the MFN clause.

